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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES V. CANINO AND THE CONTINU
ING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE: Do DRUG KINGPINS HAVE A RIGHT
TO SPECIFIC JUROR AGREEMENT?
INTRODUCTION
One might assume that in federal criminal trials, a convicting jury
must agree on the crime or crimes that the defendant committed. As
one court put it, "[u]nanimity is an indispensable element of a federal
jury triaL"! Absolute unanimity is not guaranteed, however, espe
cially when the case involves a complex statutory crime. Take, for
example, a case in which the criminal defendant, "DO," is accused of
committing the crime of "A." Commission of that crime involves es
sentially two acts, "B" and "C." Moreover, committing "c" requires
the commission of three predicate acts. Six of the jurors find DO
guilty of three particular acts, which satisfy part "c" of the crime,
while the other six find "DO" guilty of three entirely different acts
which satisfy "C." All twelve agree that "DO" is guilty of crime "A."
May the jury return a guilty verdict and convict "DO?"
The Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute ("CCE")2 describes a
complex crime much like the crime of "A" in the aforementioned hy
pothetical. In United States v. Canino,3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the validity of the defendant's
conviction under the CCE without requiring specific juror unanimity
on the statute's "continuing series" element. 4 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, in United States v.
Echeverri,s required specific unanimity with respect to the "continuing
1. United States v. Scalzitti, 578 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 1978); see also infra notes 55
56 and accompanying text.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). The Continuing Criminal Enterprise provision was en
acted as part of title III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1988».
3. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992).
4. Id. at 947.
5. 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988).
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series" element. 6 This Note will consider these two conflicting deci
sions and how the jury unanimity requirement interacts with the CCE.
Section I addresses the components of the CCE, its purpose, the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, and the requirement of jury
unanimity in federal criminal trials. Section II discusses the conflict
ing cases on the issue of jury unanimity with respect to the "continu
ing series" element of the CCE. It reviews the facts and reasoning of
the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Canino,1 as well as
the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Echeverri. 8 Section III
analyzes the present state of the law on the issue of juror divergence
with regard to the underlying factual elements of a charged offense. It
examines the due process implications of juror disagreement and dis
cusses the recent Supreme Court decision, Schad v. Arizona,9 which
considered factual divergence among jurors in terms of a state's first
degree murder statute. Section III also compares the CCE to the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")lO and
discusses the treatment ofjury unanimity in RICO cases. Finally, this
Note concludes that the jury should be required to agree, by a substan
tial majority, on the underlying predicate acts that establish a "contin
uing series of violations" under the CCE and that the use of special
verdicts would serve to assure such agreement.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute

The CCE was originally drafted as part of the Drug Abuse Pre
vention and Control Act of 1970 (the "Act").ll Congress enacted the
Act which amended the Public Health Services Act and similar laws. 12
The purpose of the Act was threefold: (1) to provide authority to in
crease drug abuse prevention and user rehabilitation efforts, (2) to sup
ply more effective law enforcement means to carry out drug abuse
prevention and control measures, and (3) to establish an overall plan
6. Id. at 643; see infra text accompanying note 84.
7. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992).
8. 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988).
9. Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
10. 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi
zations Act was enacted as title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988».
11. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988». This Act compiled over 50
drug control laws into a single comprehensive regulatory scheme. H.R. REP. No. 1444,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4571.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note II, at 4566.
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of criminal punishment for drug violations.13 Previous legislation in
the area of drug abuse prevention and control had been diverse and
often duplicative. 14 The Act set out to collect these laws "in one piece
of legislation based upon new scientific information . . . and greater
information concerning the scope of the problem."15
The Act was a full-fledged attack on illegal drug trafficking. 16
Congress recognized that the drug problem was a growing concern
that appeared "to be approaching epidemic proportions,"17 and that
was in need of immediate and focused attention. With the Act, Con
gress provided a structured method of both punishment and rehabili
tation in an effort to bring a halt to the rapidly growing problem of
drug abuse in this country.18
The CCEI9 specifically targeted drug "kingpins," or those per
sons within a narcotics operation holding a position of management
and authority. 20 The Supreme Court has referred to the CCE as a
carefully constructed provision of the Act which aims to reach and
punish "the 'top brass' in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot
soldiers."21 Courts have recognized that Congress used the CCE sec
tion of the Act to deter "large-scale profit-making enterprises engaged
in the illegal importation, manufacture and distribution of controlled
substances."22
13. Id. at 4567.
14. Id. at 4571. Since 1914, Congress had passed more than 50 pieces of legislation
addressing control of narcotics and dangerous drugs. [d.
15. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 11, at 4575.
17. Id. at 4572.
18. Id. at 4575.
19. The CCE was originally passed as § 408 of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Con
trol Act of 1970, PUb. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1988».
20. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A). Section 848(c) states as follows:
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise if
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chap
ter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this sub
chapter or subchapter II of this chapter
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more
other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management,
and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
Id.
21. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985).
22. See. e.g., United States v. Valenzuela. 596 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Violation of the CCE leads to harsh penalties, including a
mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years in prison23 and, under
certain conditions, mandatory life imprisonment24 or the death pen
alty.25 In an effort to assure that only professional criminals who filled
the rank of drug lord or "kingpin" would be convicted under the
CCE, Congress structured the statute to describe a complex statutory
crime. 26 Conviction under the CCE requires, first, that the defendant
commit a number of predicate narcotics offenses,27 and, second, that
the defendant's criminal acts meet a number of additional
conditions.28
Section 848(c) outlines the requirements for a CCE violation. 29
While the predicate offense required for CCE prosecution is any drug
related felony within the Act,30 the accused must have committed that
predicate crime as part of a "continuing series" of violations. 3! Fur
thermore, the defendant must undertake this series of drug-related vio
lations in the position of supervisor or manager of at least five other
individuals,32 while obtaining substantial income or gain therefrom. 33
The CCE provision was enacted because Congress acknowledged
that the drug enforcement laws of the past had been "for the most
part, ineffective in halting the increased upsurge of drug abuse
23. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988).
24. Id. § 848(b).
25. Id. § 848(e).
26. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 146 (1977). The most widely recognized
complex statutory crime is RICO, which was enacted, like the CCE, in 1970. See supra
note 10. The complex statutory crime is relatively modem but has its roots in long-recog
nized federal crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (Mail Fraud Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988)
(Travel Act).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(I).
28. [d. § 848(c)(2); see supra note 20.
29. See supra note 20.
30. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(I). The prohibited drug-related acts appear in §§ 841(a),
842(a), and 960(a), and encompass all illegal drug-related activity.
3J. [d. § 848(c)(2). The circuits disagree as to precisely how many violations consti
tute a "continuing series" for purposes of the CCE statute. Several circuits recognize a
continuing series to be three or more violative acts. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d
638,642 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating,
in addition, that the predicate violations do not necessarily have to be convictions), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); United States v. Collier, 358 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (E.D. Mich.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1974). Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has
interpreted a continuing series to be only two or more acts. United States V. Kramer, 955
F.2d 479, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1992); United States V. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 946 (7th Cir.
1991), cerro denied, 112 S. Ct: 1940 (1992); United States V. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100, 1104
(7th Cir.), cerro denied, 498 U.S. 876 (1990).
32. § 848(c)(2)(A); see supra note 20.
33. § 848(c)(2)(B); see supra note 20.

1993]

. CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES v. CANINO

275

throughout our United States."34 Debates prior to the provision's en
actment indicate that the statute was not aimed at "the casua1 drug
user and experimenter,"3S but rather at the "professiona1 crlmina1."36
These comments indicate Congress' concern that the statutory lan
guage be structured in a manner that would punish only drug "king
pins," and not lesser drug offenders.
While debating the issue, Congress evaluated two different meth
ods of achieving its aim. Originally, the CCE was introduced into the
House of Representatives as a "recidivist provision"37 that provided
"special penalties ... for these special criminals."38 Under that ap
proach, the jury would only eva1uate "evidence concerning the basic
crime which has been charged."39 Under the proposed version, a pro
cedure would be implemented, after conviction and before sentencing,
to identify those defendants guilty of running criminal drug enter
prises who were worthy of enhanced punishment. 40 However, Con
gress rejected this recidivist approach, concluding that it would raise
due process problems because the defendant would be unaware of
what evidence was submitted to the judge during sentencing. 41
Congress enacted a second method, which embodied an offense
approach.42 This approach defined the CCE crime as a new and sepa
rate offense. 43 The government would have to prove all the require
ments of the CCE offense at trial, making prior drug violations
elements of the CCE charge instead of regarding them as evidence to
34. 116 CONGo REC. 33,630 (1970). This is consistent with the overall purpose ofthe
Act. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
35. 116 CONGo REC. 33,631 (1970).
36. Id. (remarks of Rep. Poff, sponsor of amendment adding §§ 409-410).
37. Garrett V. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 783 (1985) (considering the congressional
debate on the two versions of the CCE).
38. 116 CONGo REC. 33,630 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poll).
39. Id.
40. Ga"ett, 471 U.S. at 783. The factors presently listed in subsection two of the
CCE would have been presented to the judge prior to sentencing to establish the need for
increased punishment of a particular defendant. See supra note 20. .
41. 116 CONGo REC. 33,631 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). Representative Eck
hardt, while criticizing the recidivist approach, stated, "[b]ut we would be making a terrible
mistake if, because of its emotional impact, we should throwaway due process oflaw." Id.
His concern was that the recidivist approach permitted a defendant's sentence to be "en
hanced from 5 to 25 years without his knowing what the evidence against him was and
what the matter is all about." Id. He supported the second approach, which assured that
"if you are going to prove a man guilty, you have to come into court and prove every
element of the continuing criminal offense." Id.
42. Id.; see Ga"ett, 471 U.S..at 783.
43. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note II, at 4566.
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be weighed at the time of sentencing. 44 Congress hailed this approach
as being in line with the "traditional American criminal process,"4S
which requires that the government prove each element of an offense
at trial. 46
The Supreme Court has recognized that the CCE created a sepa
rate criminal offense under which Congress intended to allow prosecu
tion for both the predicate offenses and the CCE offense itself.47 In
addition, courts have repeatedly upheld the CCE's harsh penalties in
the face of criminal defendants' arguments that the statute is
unconstitutional.48
Through the CCE statute, Congress has provided a powerful
weapon against the serious drug offender. The various elements of the
statute49 seek to assure that a defendant convicted of a CCE offense is
an individual who fills the role of drug lord or "kingpin." Those ele
ments, however, give rise to problems of jury concurrence because a
general verdict of guilt on the CCE charge does not assure that the
jurors agreed, either unanimously, or even by a substantial majority,
upon which of the defendant's acts constituted the "continuing
series. "50

B. Jury Unanimity in Federal Criminal Trials
The constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury is embod
ied in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. 5 1 The Supreme
44. 116 CONGo REC. 33,631 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt); see 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(c)(I) (1988).
45. 116 CONGo REC. 33,631 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt).
46. Id.
47. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 786 (1985).
48. United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1529 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1100 (1985) (holding that the CCE does not violate the defendant's due process
rights); United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 588 n.7 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1188 (1985) (recognizing that the CCE was not void for vagueness on its face); United
States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1971) (concluding that provisions of the
CCE did not unconstitutionally encroach on judicial authority); United States v. Lozaw,
427 F.2d 911, 917 (2d Cir. 1970) (upholding the constitutionality of the CCE's mandated
prohibition of probation).
49. See supra note 20.
50. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988); see supra note 20.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. That amendment states,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
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Court has concluded that this guarantee is "a fundamental right, es
sential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair
trials are provided for all defendants."52 In criminal cases, the
Supreme Court has recognized that a trial by jury provides "indispen
sable protection against the possibility of governmental oppression, "53
and allows the defendant's guilt or innocence to be determined by a
group of lay people whose common-sense judgment stands between
the accused and his or her accuser. 54
In addition to a trial by jury, the defendant in a federal criminal
trial has a right to a unanimous jury verdict. 55 While, in the past,
courts recognized that the Sixth Amendment was the source of the
federal criminal defendant's right to jury unanimity,56 the United
States Supreme Court has recently indicated that the question of juror
agreement on factual issues should be interpreted under due process. 57
Although the Court did not reach the unanimity issue, it interpreted
the problem of "verdict specificity" under due process. 58 Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 31(a) requires unanimous jury verdicts for the
purpose of protecting a defendant's constitutional rights. 59 Conflicting
52. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (recognizing the extension of the
right to a trial by jury to state criminal proceedings via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
53. Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 330 (1980).
54. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
55. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 366, 380 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Andres v. United
States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 945 (1987).
In Apodaca, the Court noted four theories of the origin of the unanimity requirement,
but did not attempt to define the scope of this right. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2. First,
the Court recognized that the requirement of juror unanimity might have developed in
order to counteract a lack of other rules to ensure the defendant a fair trial. Id. Second,
the Court noted that the requirement may have arisen from the ancient system of trial by
compurgation, which added to the number of compurgators until one party had gained the
support of twelve. Id. Third, the Court recognized the possibility that the practice of
unanimity developed because in medieval times minority jurors would be guilty of criminal
perjury. Id. Finally, the Court noted the possibility that jury unanimity arose from the
concept of consent, which carried with it the idea of unanimity. Id.
56. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 356; Andres, 333 U.S. at 740; Schiff, 801 F.2d at 108.
57. Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491, 2498 n.5. (1991).
58. Id. According to the Supreme Court decision, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970), due process requires that every essential element of a crime must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. The prosecution must meet that standard of proof for every fact neces
sary to establish the crime charged. Id. at 364; see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
This case is not, however, of much assistance in determining the degree of factual specificity
needed to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard.
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). The rule states, "[t]he verdict shall be unanimous." Id.;
see also United States v. Essex, 734 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the trial court
committed plain error by allowing II jurors to decide the case when the court did not
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decisions in the Seventh and Third Circuits indicate, however, that
uncertainty remains over the scope and extent of the unanimity
requirement. 6O
Jury unanimity" 'means more than a conclusory agreement that
the defendant has violated the statute in question; there is a require
ment of substantial agreement as to the principal factual elements un
derlying a specified offense.' "61 General unanimity occurs when the
jurors are in agreement on a general proposition, such as that the de
fendant is guilty of the charged offense. 62 Specific unanimity, on the
other hand, requires that the trial court "augment the general instruc
tion to ensure the jury understands its duty to unanimously agree to a
particular set of facts. "63
In the ordinary case, a general unanimity instruction will suffice
to protect the defendant's constitutional rights. 64 However, several
attempt to locate the missing juror, even though the defendant had waived a full 12 person
jury).
60. See United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a general
unanimity instruction on the "continuing series" element was sufficient), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1940 (1992); United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988) (requiring a
specific unanimity instruction to assure that each juror specifically agreed upon the precise
violations the defendant committed that constituted the "continuing series"); see infra
notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
61. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concur
ring) (quoting United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983».
62. Ferris, 719 F.2d at 1407 (holding that a general unanimity instruction suffices
when presentation of a case involving multiple acts within one count of an indictment is so
clear that unanimity can be presumed).
63. United States v. Echeverry, 719 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1983).
64. United States v. Hemandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1572 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the district court's general unanimity instruction on the "continuing series"
element of a CCE charged offense was harmless upon finding that the jury had unani
mously agreed on the three predicate offenses), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1003 (1990); United
States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1321 (9th Cir.) (holding that the district court's failure
to give a specific unanimity instruction was not plain error in a conspiracy case where the
court found no possibility of juror confusion), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989); Ferris, 719
F.2d at 1407 (holding that, in a case involving possession of controlled substances with
intent to distribute, conspiracy to distribute, and drug distribution, the indictment was
"sufficiently simple and clear in its presentation" to necessitate only a general unanimity
instruction).
In Hernandez-Escarsega, for example, the trial court gave a general instruction that in
order to convict the defendant, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
alleged "offenses were part of three or more offenses committed by the Defendant over a
definite period of time in violation of the federal narcotics laws which make it a crime to
conspire to import and distribute marijuana." 886 F.2d at 1573. While this instruction
stated that the offenses must be violations of the federal narcotics laws, thus satisfying the
first part of the CCE, it does not require unanimity as to which offenses were committed.
Id. In Ferris, the trial court's general unanimity instruction "stated simply that the jury's
verdict must be unanimous." 719 F.2d at 1407.
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circuits have concluded that a specific unanimity instruction is war
ranted when the criminal statute involved is sufficiently complex. 6s
For instance, in United States v. Anguiano,66 the court identified a
number of situations that provoked a "genuine possibility ofjuror con
fusion,"67 thus necessitating specific juror unanimity.68 According to
65. United States v. Jerome, 942 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring specific
unanimity as to the identity of the five persons supervised by the defendant in a CCE case);
United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 929 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court's
failure to give a specific unanimity instruction in a peIjury case was reversible error because
"there was a reasonable possibility that the jury was not unanimous with respect to at least
one statement in each count"); United States v. Sanchez, 914 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir.
1990) (concluding that a specific unanimity instruction was not necessary in a case involv
ing the crime of assaulting a federal officer, but recognizing in dicta the need for specific
juror unanimity when different jurors may have convicted the defendant based on different
facts due to complex evidence, a discrepancy between the evidence and the indictment, or
some other factor presenting a substantial possibility of juror confusion), cert. denied, III
S. Ct. 1626 (1991); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
that the defendant, Oliver L. North, who was charged with crimes relating to a congres
sional investigation, was entitled to a specific unanimity instruction where various permuta
tions would have supported a valid conviction, presenting a real and significant possibility
ofjuror confusion), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991); Uni~ed States v. Mobile Materials,
Inc., 881 F.2d 866, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the appropriateness of the district
court's specific jury instruction which required the jury to find the single, continuing con
spiracy charged in the indictment), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1043 (1990); United States v.
Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1114 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that where a single count
charged two separate false statements, the jury must have been unanimous as to at least one
specific statement), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1025 (1990); United States v. Gilley, 836 F.2d
1206, 1211-13 (9th Cir.) (acknowledging the sufficiency of a general unanimity instruction
in the usual case, but holding that a specific unanimity instruction should have been given
where the charge of conducting an illegal gambling business raised the possibility of less
than unanimous juror agreement on the period in which five individuals were continually
involved), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 219 (1988); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d
Cir. 1987) (concluding that the trial court should have instructed the jury that they must
reach unanimous agreement regarding which of the defendant's acts constituted each ele
ment of the charged offense); United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987)
(holding that when a count will be submitted to the court on alternative theories, prudence
counsels the trial court to give an augmented instruction if requested); United States v.
Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the necessity for specific unanimity
in a case where the defendant's acts of extortion were directed at separate victims, occurred
at different times and places, involved different approaches of relying on threats, and were
committed by fluctuating numbers of individuals); Echeverry, 719 F.2d at 975 (finding the
district court's general unanimity instruction on the defendant's drug conspiracy and distri
bution charges ambiguous, and reversing the defendant's conviction on those charges).
66. 873 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989).
67. Id. at 1319.
68. Id. First, the court held that a specific unanimity instruction is required in con
spiracy cases where the jury indicates that it is confused about the nature of the charge.
Id.; see also United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 219 (1988); Echeverry, 719
F.2d at 975 (stating that the jury's questions indicated their confusion regarding mUltiple
conspiracies and that such inquiry should have alerted the trial judge to the likelihood of a
non-unanimous verdict). Second, the court noted that a specific unanimity instruction

280

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 15:271

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, "[w]hen
'there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction
may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the defend
ant committed different acts,' "69 the trial court is obligated to ensure
that the jury " 'understands its duty to unanimously agree to a partic
ular set of facts.' "70
Generally, the unanimous verdict rule "requires jurors to be in
substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step prelimi
nary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged."71 This requirement ordinarily extends to all issues left for
resolution by the jury.72 It is not clear whether the jurors in a CCE
trial must specifically agree on which of the defendant's drug viola
tions constitute the "continuing series" under the statute. 73

II.

CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON JURY UNANIMITY IN
CCE CASES

The CCE statute requires that the defendant commit a drug-re
lated felony74 that is "part of a continuing series of violations"75 "un
dertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons
with respect to whom such person occupies a position of ... manage
ment."76 Thus, the CCE statute contains two parts. 77 First, the demight be necessary when the indictment was sufficiently factually complex to indicate the
possibility of jury confusion. Anguiano, 873 F.2d at 1320; see also Gilley, 836 F.2d at 1211
12. Third, the Ninth Circuit indicated that cases in which the jury is likely to be confused
because the indictment is particularly broad and ambiguous would necessitate a specific
unanimity instruction. Anguiano, 873 F.2d at 1319; see, e.g., Gordon, 844 F.2d at 1401
(concluding that the first count of the indictment, charging the defendant with two different
acts of conspiracy, presented a distinct possibility of jury confusion as to upon which of the
defendant's acts the jury had unanimously agreed).
69. United States v. Powell, 932 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
256 (1991) (quoting United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1986».
70. Payseno, 782 F.2d at 836 (quoting Echeverry, 719 F.2d at 975).
71. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453,457-58 (5th Cir. 1977).
72. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948).
73. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
74. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(1) (1988); see supra note 30.
75. § 848(c)(2); see supra note 20.
76. § 848(c)(2)(A); see supra note 20. The statute goes on to require that the defend
ant obtain substantial income from the aforementioned violative activity. § 848(c)(2)(B).
77. The CCE does not expressly state that the "continuing series" and "five or more
underlings" provisions are indeed elements of the crime. The legislative history of the stat
ute, however, indicates that the "continuing series" provision was indeed meant as an ele
ment. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court noted, the
version of the CCE that was adopted "made engagement in a continuing criminal enter
prise a new and distinct offense with all its elements triable in court." Garrett v. United
States, 471 U.S. 773, 783 (1985) (emphasis added). The courts seem to treat the "five or

1993]

CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES v. CANINO

281

fendant must commit a "continuing series" of violations. 78 Second,
the defendant must supervise or manage five or more underlings. 79
Jury unanimity is not expressly addressed or required in any part
of the CCE. As for the five or more underlings provision, all but one
of the courts of appea1s that have considered the issue have concluded
that the Constitution does not require the jury to agree on the specific
identities of the five or more individua1s that the defendant managed
or supervised. 80 Furthermore, the courts do not require that the de
fendant's supervisory actions occur simultaneously with all of the five
or more underlings. 8 1 The supervision prong of the statute is satisfied,
therefore, even when the prosecution can only establish the defend
ant's supervision of five or more different co-conspirators at various
times during the enterprise. 82
Conversely, the "continuing series" element of the CCE statute
has given rise to a conflict among the circuits regarding the appropri
ateness of specific versus genera1 juror unanimity. In United States v.
Echeverri,83 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
concluded that the jury must unanimously agree as to which of the
more underlings" requirement as "peripheral" to the CCE's purpose and do not require
unanimity as to that part of the statute. See infra note 80. This Note does not take a
position on the validity of that view of the "five or more underlings" requirement. The
"continuing series" provision, on the other hand, addresses the substantive predicate acts
that the defendant must commit to be found guilty of a CCE charge and is, no doubt, the
part of the statute to which the Court referred in Garrett when it spoke of the elements of
the CCE offense. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 783.
78. 21 U.S.c. § 848(c)(2); see supra note 20.
79. § 848(c)(2)(A); see supra note 20.
80. United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (not requiring spe
cific unanimity); see also United States v. Moorman, 944 F.2d 801, 803 (11th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1766 (1992); United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 159 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2812 (1991); United States v. Linn, 889 F.2d 1369, 1374 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 809 (1990); United States v. Tarvers, 833 F.2d 1068, 1075 (1st
Cir. 1987); United States v. Markowski, 772 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1018 (1986). But see United States v. Jerome, 942 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1991) (requir
ing specific unanimity, reasoning that the number of persons involved presented a genuine
possibility of juror confusion).
81. United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465,1470-71 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1989 (1992); United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 553-54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 962 (1990); United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 891 (4th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Fernandez, 822 F.2d 382, 386 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987); United
States v. Boldin, 818 F.2d 771, 775-76 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d
719,731 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985);
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1034 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136
(1982).
82. Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1471.
83. 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988).
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defendant's particular violations constituted the "continuing series"
under the CCE.84
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reached a contrary decision on similar facts in United States v.
Canino. 85 In that case, the court held that the jury was not required to
reach unanimity as to the specific acts constituting the "continuing
series."86 According to the Canino majority, the constitutional re
quirement of juror unanimity in federal criminal trials is satisfied in a
CCE case when each juror finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed a "continuing series" of violations under the
CCE statute. 87
A.

United States v. Echeverri88

In Echeverri, the defendant, Elkin Echeverri, was convicted on
five drug-related charges after a trial involving seven other defend
ants.89 Echeverri was accused and convicted of operating a continuing
criminal enterprise between January 1977 and August 1984. 90 At
trial, the prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of four
unindicted co-conspirators. 91 Despite Echeverri's testimony, in which
he maintained his innocence, the jury convicted him on all five counts,
84. Id. at 643.
85. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cerr. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992).
86. Id. at 947-48; see also United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1992). In
Kramer, the court briefly addressed the defendant's jury unanimity argument. Kramer,
955 F.2d at 486-87. The defendant claimed that the jury must be instructed to agree upon
the precise acts they relied on to find a CCE "continuing series." The court simply fol
lowed Canino in finding the trial court's general unanimity instruction sufficient and the
defendant's unanimity argument unavailing. Id.
87. Canino, 949 F.2d at 947-48.
88. 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 639. The jury convicted all but one of the defendants on one or more of
the five counts. Echeverri was convicted of all five counts: (1) a RICO conspiracy, (2) a
substantive RICO offense, (3) operation of a continuing criminal enterprise, (4) a drug
related conspiracy in violation of21 U.S.C. § 846, and (5) possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute. Id. at 641. Defendant Susan Commorato was acquitted of the only charge
for which she was tried. Id. at 641 n.2.
In 1969, Echeverri emigrated from Columbia to the United States and by 1977 had
established a drug distribution operation out of his apartment where he lived with his
brother in Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Id. at 640. Echeverri's drug business operated in
five states-New Jersey, California, Florida, Texas, and Colorado-and involved several
other individuals as conduits, distributors, and couriers. Id. The operation flourished until
1982, when Echeverri's brother was murdered in New York. Id. The murder led to a
police investigation of the Echeverri apartment, which revealed drugs, drug paraphernalia,
$45,000 in cash, and notebooks containing drug distribution records. Id.
90. Id. at 641.
91. Id. at 640. The four individuals who testified were unindicted co-conspirators
who had been given immunity or other benefits for their testimony. Id.
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including a CCE violation. 92
On appeal, Echeverri raised several objections. 93 Of particular
importance, he alleged that the trial judge erroneously gave the jury
only a general unanimity instruction on the "continuing series" ele
ment of the CCE statute. 94 The prosecution alleged that the defendant
had committed several different drug transactions. 95 Echeverri main
tained that conviction under the CCE required specific jury unanimity
upon precisely which of those transactions the jury relied in finding a
"continuing series."96 As a result, Echeverri contended that the trial
court's refusal to give his requested instruction amounted to reversible
error.97
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Echeverri
and reversed his conviction. 98 The court reasoned "that a significant
potential for jury confusion" on the CCE count existed to warrant
more than the general unanimity instruction given by the trial court. 99
The Third Circuit's holding was primarily based on its prior holding
in United States v. Beros .100
In Beros, a union officer was convicted of violating two federal
statutes that prohibited the wilful misuse of union funds lOl and em
ployee welfare benefit plan funds. 102 The defendant was also convicted
92. See supra note 89.
93. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 639. Echeverri alleged that his convictions could not
stand because (I) the district court refused to give his requested jury instruction which
addressed the need for unanimous agreement on the specific acts the jury found the defend
ant to have committed which established a "continuing series of violations" under the
CCE, (2) on two occasions the district court admitted certain evidence of other, uncharged
criminal conduct, in error, and (3) the predicate acts that the jury found under RICO did
not establish a "pattern" under that statute. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 640-41.
96. Id. at 642.
97. Id. Echeverri had requested that the trial judge give the jury the following
instruction:
The second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
is that this offense was part of a continuing series of violations of the federal
narcotics laws. A continuing series of violations is three or more violations of the
federal narcotics laws committed over a definite period of time.
You must unanimously agree on which three acts constitute the continuing
series of violations.
Id. See supra note 31 for a discussion of the conftict that exists among the circuits as to
whether a "continuing series" requires two or three narcotics violations.
98. Id. at 643.
99. Id.
100. 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987); see Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 642.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1988).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1988).
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of conspiring with another individual to commit these offenses. 103 At
trial, the judge refused to instruct the jurors that they must reach
unanimous agreement with respect to which of the defendant's acts
constituted each element of the crime charged. The Third Circuit con
cluded that this refusal was erroneous. 104
The Echeverri court analogized the facts before it to the circum
stances in Beros. 105 Although the Beros case did not involve the CCE
statute, it did involve two complex crimes that required a number of
underlying predicate acts to constitute the charged offense. 106 The
Echeverri court reasoned that the comparable complexity of these stat
utes was sufficient to make the two cases "indistinguishable." 107
The court concluded that, due to the spectrum of choices by
which the jury could have come to its verdict and the possibility that
jurors could have disagreed as to precisely which of the defendant's
acts supported a conviction, a sufficiently strong potential for jury mis
understanding and confusion existed to necessitate a specific unanim
ity instruction. lOS This decision was primarily based upon the theory
that the complexity of the crime determines the need for a specific
unanimity instruction. 109
The courts in both Echeverri and Beros premised their reasoning
on United States v. Gipson. 110 In Gipson, the defendant was charged
with violating a federal statute that prohibited receiving, concealing,
storing, bartering, selling, or disposing of stolen vehicles moving in
interstate commerce. III The Gipson court found that violation of this
statute could arise from one of several specific acts and, therefore,
103. Beros, 833 F.2d at 457.
104. Id. at 458. The appellate court in Beros reasoned that "the range of possibilities
by which the jury could have reached its verdict, and the possibility that individual jurors
reasonably could have disagreed as to which act supported the guilt," necessitated the use
of a clear unanimity instruction. Id.
105. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1988).
106. Both statutes at issue in Beros required embezzling, stealing, abstracting, and
converting certain funds to one's own use for violation of the specified offense. Beros, 833
F.2d at 459; see also 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1988).
107. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 643.
108. Id. at 642-43.
109. Id. See supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of this approach
as it has been applied to a number of complex statutes.
The Echeverri opinion also referred to the trial court's treatment of the defendant's
RICO charge and indicated that the specific instruction that was given with respect to the
RICO charge should have also been given on the CCE charge. Id. at 643. See infra note
264 for a discussion of the court's suggestion.
110. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
Ill. Id. at 455; see National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 101(1)(I)(a), 62 Stat. 806 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1988».
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presented a jury unanimity problem. 112 The court reasoned that, in
order to assure unanimity, the jury was required to substantially agree
on exactly what acts the defendant had committed before he could be
convicted. l13 As a result, the Fifth Circuit concluded that when there
is a potential for jury confusion or a less than unanimous verdict due
to the presence of a single, criminal statute that prohibits a number of
acts, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict
would not be preserved by the jury's simple consensus on guilt "unless
[a] prerequisite of jury consensus as to the defendant's course of action
is also required."1l4
The Third Circuit in Echeverri reasoned that the Gipson rationale
was applicable in a case involving the CCE. 1lS Because the district
court's jury instruction merely informed the jury that the term "con
tinuing series" meant three or more drug-related offenses, it failed to
assure unanimous juror agreement that the defendant committed the
same three violations.1l6 Consequently, the Echeverri court found
these circumstances and the CCE statute to be sufficiently confusing to
the jury to warrant more than the district court's general unanimity
instruction. 117
B.

United States v. Canino l18

In Canino, the defendant, Michael J. Canino, was convicted of a
marijuana distribution conspiracy and of engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise. I 19 The grand jury indictment specified five trans
actions, from 1982 until 1986,120 in which Canino headed an organiza
tion that accepted drug shipments for storage and sale l2l in violation
112. Gipson, 553 F.2d at 456-57.
113. Id. at 457-58.
114. Id. at 458.
115. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
116. [d. Some courts recognize that two, rather than three, violations establish a
continuing series. See supra note 31.
117. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 643.
118. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992).
119. Id. at 932. The remaining defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute
in excess of 1000 pounds of marijuana. Id. Canino and his fellow defendants were in
volved in the notorious "Randy Lanier-Benjamin Kramer" drug operation, which was re
sponsible for importing over 600,000 pounds of marijuana into the United States over a
period of ten years. Id. at 933.
120. In 1986, a barge load of marijuana that was shipped to San Francisco, Califor
nia en route to Pennsylvania was interdicted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. at
934.
121. Id. at 933. Canino had originally acted as a mere purchaser from the Lanier
organization. Beginning in 1982, however, he increased his participation and eventually
became a major player in the Lanier drug ring. Id. at 933-34.
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of the federal drug conspiracy laws. 122
Canino raised an objection to the lower court's general unanimity
instruction with respect to the "continuing series" element of the CCE
count. 123 Canino argued that the jury should have been instructed
that they must unanimously agree upon which of the drug offenses
offered into evidence by the government established the continuing se
ries necessary for CCE conviction. 124 His argument was primarily
based upon the holding in Echeverri and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 31(a).12S
The Canino court noted that the Third Circuit in Echeverri found
reversible error in the district court's failure to charge the jury that it
must unanimously agree as to which of the defendant's acts consti
tuted a "continuing series of violations" under the CCE.126 After a
brief reference to the Sixth Amendment requirement of a unanimous
jury verdict,127 the Canino majority discussed the basis of the
Echeverri court's reasoning and concluded that the CCE was quite dif
ferent from the criminal statutes which the Echeverri court had analo
gized to the CCE.128
122. Id.
123. Id. at 945-46. The trial court gave the following jury instruction:
Thus, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty
of conspiracy to distribute more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana as charged in
Count II and/or that he is gUilty of knowingly and intentionally distributing ma
rijuana or possessing with intent to distribute marijuana as set forth in paragraphs
A through E of Count I of the indictment or he is guilty of knowingly and inten
tionally distributing or possessing with intent to distribute marijuana from a Ja
maica Load in 1984, and that this conduct, together with any additional
violations of the federal drug laws constituted a total of three or more violations
of the federal drug laws committed over the period of time charged in Count I
with a single or similar purpose. This will constitute a finding that the defendant
engaged in a continuing series of violations.
Id. at 944 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 945-46~
125. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a); see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
126. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 946 (7th Cir. 1991), cen. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1940 (1992); see supra note 84 and accompanying text. The Canino majority briefly
acknowledged, in a footnote, the Sixth Amendment requirement of a unanimous jury ver
dict, set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(a). Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.5.
127. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.5. Prior to the Canino decision, the Supreme Court
had characterized the criminal defendant's right to jury unanimity as a due process right.
Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491 (1991). Thus, it is not clear why the Canino court
interpreted that right under the Sixth Amendment.
128. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.6. See supra notes 101-02, III and accompanying
text for reference to the criminal statutes the Echeverri court compared to the CCE.
The Echeverri court had relied on the reasoning in United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d
455 (3d Cir. 1987). United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638,642-43 (3d Cir. 1988). The
Beros court relied on United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d453 (5th Cir. 1977), as support for
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The Canino court also noted that, in United States v. Gipson, 129
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit required specific unanimity
because it concluded that the acts listed in the statute at issue 130 were
so diverse that, absent a specific unanimity instruction, it would be
uncertain whether the jury found the defendant guilty of one class of
offense or another}31 The Canino court distinguished Gipson by rea
soning that the dichotomy created by the statute in Gipson was not
present in the CCE.132 The court then went on to conclude that the
"expansive breadth of culpable offenses suitable for CCE treat
ment"133 diminished the need to determine precisely which acts each
juror attributed to the defendant}34 Therefore, the court found that
the proper focus of the CCE analysis should be on the frequency of the
defendant's participation in conspiratorial drug offenses, "rather than
any particularization of the acts used to demonstrate 'continuous.' "135
The Canino court also rejected the defendant's argument con
cerning the significance of the Echeverri 136 case and referred to United
States v. Jackson.137 In Jackson, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the specific unanimity it had required
in Echeverri, 138 with respect to the "continuing series" element of the
CCE, did not apply to the part of the statute that required the CCE
defendant to supervise five or more underlings. 139 The Jackson court
reasoned that while the "continuing series" element focused on the
conduct that the CCE sought to punish, the identity of the five or
more underlings was only "peripheral" to the statute's other concern,
the conclusion that jury unanimity was required regarding the predicate acts of the CCE
charge. Beros, 833 F.2d at 460.
129. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
130. The statute at issue in Gipson prohibited receiving, concealing, storing, bar·
tering, selling, or disposing of stolen cars. See supra note III and accompanying text.
131. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.6; see Gipson, 553 F.2d at 458.
132. Canino, 949 F.2d at 946 n.6.
133. Id. But see infra note 146 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress'
intent in enacting the CCE, which arguably limits the CCE's breadth by covering only
those individuals holding superior positions in the drug ring hierarchies.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 948 n.7 .. The Canino court was concerned that the danger in carrying the
jury unanimity requirement too far would be to require unanimity on specific details that
are really more particularired than the statutory language intends. Id. See also Hayden J.
Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different·Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory;
Whether Verdicts Are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 473,
550 (1983).
136. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988).
137. 879 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1989); see Canino, 949 F.2d at 946.
138. See supra text accompanying note 84.
139. Jackson, 879 F.2d at 88·89. The court did not require specific unanimity as to
the identity of the five or more underlings. Id.
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that the defendant exercise a certain level of control over a sizeable
operation. l40 In other words, the Jackson court had determined that
the specific identity of the five or more underlings was only "periph
eral" to the concern that the defendant actually fill the rank of drug
"kingpin." 141 The Canino court stated that Jackson thus represented
a "cautious departure" from the Third Circuit's previous decision in
Echeverri. 142
However, the Canino court went on to disagree with the Jackson
rationale, finding no basis for distinguishing between the "continuing
series" and "five or more underlings" elements for purposes of juror
unanimity. 143 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the reasoning in two of its own opinions, 144
which recognized the sufficiency of a general unanimity instruction for
the "five or more underlings" requirement, should also apply, byanal
ogy, to the CCE's "continuing series" element. 14S As support for this
conclusion, the court identified the purpose of the CCE statute as pun
ishing and deterring large and profitable drug operations. 146 There
fore, the Canino court reasoned that requiring specific unanimity on
the defendant's "continuing series" of predicate acts would run
counter to the CCE's general purpose of deterring large-scale drug
rings. 147 The court feared that the particularization involved with re
quiring specific unanimity might result in unjustified acquittals. 148
The Canino court analogized the "five or more underlings" ele
ment, and the lack of specificity required thereunder, with the "contin
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 946-47 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1940 (1992).
143. Id. at 947.
144. United States V. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1988); United States V. Markow
ski, 772 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1985).
145. Canino, 949 F.2d at 947.
146. Id. The court relied on United States V. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th
Cir. 1979), for its articulation of the purpose of the CCE. Canino, 949 F.2d at 947.
However, the Canino court's analysis failed to address the fact that the CCE is limited
in scope because it seeks to punish only drug "kingpins." The court instead focused only
upon the "expansive breadth" of the predicate offenses that fall within the ambit of the
CCE. Id. at 946 n.6; see supra note 30.
During congressional debate over the CCE, Representative Taft referred to the CCE's
"purview." 116 CONGo REc. 33,630-31 (1970). This reference acknowledged that the stat
ute was created for the limited purpose of punishing the "kingpins" of the drug ring hierar
chies and not their "lieutenants and foot soldiers." See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.
773, 781 (1985) (discussing the legislative history of the CCE); see supra note 21 and ac
companying text.
147. Canino, 949 F.2d at 947.
148. Id. at 947-48.
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uing series" element, and reasoned that there should be consistency in
the way the CCE is applied. 149 The court noted that the purpose of
the CCE is to punish a defendant whom the jury finds to have partici
pated in a connected series of narcotics activities with sufficient fre
quency,lso As a result, the court concluded that, in a CCE case, the
purpose of the statute is fulfilled when each member of the jury finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed at least two
predicate acts. lSI The jury need not specifically agree upon which two
violations the defendant committed. IS2
Juror divergence on the underlying predicate acts that constitute
a "continuing series" under the CCE raises a question of how far the
jury must go in agreeing upon particular facts. Although the Canino
and Echeverri courts characterized the question in terms of unanimity
under the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
problem of juror divergence on certain factual issues under the re
quirements of due process. IS3 An analysis of due process, therefore,
will be helpful in resolving the problem of juror non-concurrence and
how it should be treated with respect to the CCE.

III.

ANALYSIS

In federal criminal trials, a defendant's constitutional right to a
unanimous jury verdict is well established. I S4 In a CCE case, this
149. Id. The court declined "to adopt a chaotic rule which requires the jury to make
a unanimous finding with respect to some factual issues (predicate acts) and be relieved of
such a requirement in relation to findings of other factual issues ('five or more other per
sons')." Id. at 948.
150. Id.
151. Id. See supra note 31 for a discussion of the split among the circuits as to
whether a continuing series is established by the commission of two or three predicate acts.
152. Id. at 946.
153. Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491 (1991); see supra notes 57-58 and accompany
ing text.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453
(5th Cir. 1977), highlighted the existence of a constitutional problem when a court allows
juror divergence on the factual elements of a crime. The court was the first circuit court to
reverse a conviction based on the likelihood of juror disparity on the underlying factual
elements constituting the crime. Id. at 459. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the trial
court's instruction, which permitted jurors to convict without reaching agreement as to
what crime had occurred, was in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial and his procedural right to a unanimous verdict under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 31(a). Id. at 456. The Gipson decision triggered a number of criminal appeals,
two of which are represented by United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988),
and United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991). As is evidenced by the conflict
ing holdings of these two cases, the issue of factual juror concurrence remains controver
sial. The Gipson court did not provide much guidance in resolving the problem.
154. See supra note 55.

290

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:271

right is satisfied when all of the jurors agree that the defendant oper
ated a continuing criminal enterprise. Beneath this general verdict of
guilt, however, lies a question regarding whether the jury must also
agree upon the factual components or predicate acts that gave rise to
such a verdict. The Supreme Court has recognized that jurors may
convict a defendant without coming to a unanimous agreement on the
specific mitigating circumstances surrounding the defendant's acts. ISS
However, the Court does require some juror specificity regarding the
defendant's conduct. IS6 A significant area of constitutional inquiry ex
ists between these two vague borders.ls7 The problem of juror agree
ment on predicate acts of the "continuing series" element of the CCE
is a small piece of an expansive constitutional problem that was not
addressed by either the Echeverri IS8 court or the Canino IS9 court.
Neither Echeverri nor Canino characterized the juror divergence
problem as one of due process, as the Supreme Court required in
Schad v. Arizona. Echeverri was decided well before Schad, but
Canino was decided shortly afterwards. Despite this timing, Canino
identified the question ofjuror agreement on the CCE predicate acts as
one of Sixth Amendment unanimity and did not recognize the due
process concem. l60 Nevertheless, after Schad, the question of juror
agreement or divergence on the underlying factual elements of a crime
155. See. e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). The defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder and the Court held that North Carolina's unanimity re
quirement impermissibly limited the jurors consideration of mitigating evidence to reverse
the defendant's conviction and death sentence. Id. at 435. In his concurring opinion, Jus
tice Blackmun commented that different jurors might come to the same bottom-line con
clusion on the basis of different pieces of evidence. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
He stated that "[p]lainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on
the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict." Id.
156. See. e.g., Schad, III S. Ct. at 2497-98 (1991). The plurality opinion in Schad
recognized that the jury must reach agreement that the defendant committed a particular
crime. The Court indicated that, "nothing in our history suggests that the Due Process
Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a charge of 'Crime' so generic that
any combination of jury findings of embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax
evasion, or littering, for example, would suffice for conviction." Id.
157. See Scott W. Howe, Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases: Constitutional Limits
on Factual Disagreements Among Convicting Jurors, 58 Mo. L. REV. I (1993), for a thor
ough discussion of this constitutional problem.
158. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988).
159. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1940 (1992).
160. Id. at 946 n.5. The only indication of any concern over the requirements of due
process in the Canino opinion occurred in the court's concluding remarks on the issue of
juror unanimity when it stated that "[t]he constitutional requirement of juror unanimity in
federal criminal offenses is satisfied when each juror in a CCE trial is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant charged under the CCE statute committed two predicate
offenses." Id. at 948 (emphasis added). The court failed to discuss, however, whether such
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must be resolved in terms of a due process analysis. 161

A.

Due Process Background

It has long been assumed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
on a criminal charge is constitutionally required for conviction. 162
The Supreme Court, in In re Winship,163 stated that the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "basic in our law and rightly
one of the boasts of a free society ... and a safeguard of due process of
law in the historic, procedural content of 'due process.' "164 The rea
sonable doubt standard is a vital tool in reducing the risk of convic
tions based on factual error. 16S It provides a material foundation for
the presumption of innocence, which lies at the heart of our criminal
justice system. 166
In his opinion for the Winship Court, Justice Brennan advocated
giving the accused the outcome advantage. 167 To accomplish this end,
a reasonable doubt is raised when jurors disagree on the factual basis constituting a "con
tinuing series" under the statute.
The reasonable doubt language in the Canino opinion is likely to arise from the fact
that the unanimity required by the Sixth Amendment serves to effectuate the reasonable
doubt standard. See Note, Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues: United States
v. Gipson, 91 HARV. L. REV. 499, 501 (1977) (discussing the Gipson decision and agreeing
with the court's holding that the Sixth Amendment requires conviction by a jury in a fed
eral case to be based upon juror agreement on a specific act along with a general consensus
on the defendant's guilt) [hereinafter Note, Right to Jury Unanimity].
161. The relevant language of the Fifth Amendment states as follows: "No person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime ... nor shall any person
... be depriVed of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U:S. CONST.
amend. V.
While the first place of inquiry would normally be with the statute itself, the language
of the CCE provides no guidance regarding the extent to which a jury must agree upon the
factual predicate act requirements of the "continuing series" element. In addition, the leg
islative history provides no direction on the issue. See supra note 146. Consequently, one
must turn to the Constitution to resolve the problem regarding upon what a jury is required
to agree in federal criminal trials.
162. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
163. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
164. Id. at 362 (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting».
165. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
166. Id. at 363.
167. Id. The opinion noted,
"There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding,
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an
interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin
of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden of ... persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958».
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the burden of proof is allocated to the prosecutor in cases where the
accused has something of transcending value at stake. 168 The concept
of due process has at its foundation a concern for protection of the
innocent from wrongful condemnation. 169 Justice Harlan, in his con
curring opinion in Winship, noted that in a criminal case, the due pro
cess requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "bottomed on
a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."17o
The constitutional mandate of the "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal cases l7 • reveals the Court's recognition of
the necessity of factual concurrence among convicting jurors. The
Court stated that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."I72 The Court did not comment, however, on the level of
factual specificity that convicting jurors must reach. 173
1.

Facts that Require Juror Agreement

In an attempt to define a line of demarcation between factual is
sues upon which a jury must agree and those upon which a jury need
not agree, the courts use a standard of materiality.174 The dividing
line between "material" fact issues, on which the jury must reach
agreement, and more specific "immaterial" issues, is not always
c1ear.1 75
The courts have suggested different methods of determining when
a factual issue is sufficiently material to require specific juror agree
ment. 176 Most courts hold that a viable jury non-concurrence claim
168. Id. at 363.
169. Id. at 374 (Harlan, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 372.
171. Id. at 362.
172. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
173. Although the Winship Court did not clearly articulate which cases require juror
agreement on the factual issues underlying a given offense, one commentator has suggested
a factual concurrence mandate which would restrict divergence among convicting jurors as
a safeguard against erroneous convictions. Howe, supra note 157, at 7-16. Professor Howe
suggests that in situations where there is a potential for jurors to disagree over the factual
basis for a guilty verdict, "jurors ought to be required to agree upon at least one of the
factual alternatives before finding the defendant guilty." Id. at 82.
174. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lennon,
246 F.2d 24,27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 836 (1957) (recognizing the physical filing
of a false tax return as the most specific material "act" upon which the jury was required to
unanimously agree); see also Note, Right to Jury Unanimity, supra note 160, at 501.
175. See Note, Right to Jury Unanimity, supra note 160, at 501.
176. See Howe, supra note 157, at 21-47. Professor Howe's article analyzed the
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only arises when a single criminal charge involves two or more distinct
and separate crimes. 177 Thus, a convicted defendant may only appeal
based on a claim that the jury's verdict was defective because of non
concurrence when the indictment had alleged two or more distinct
criminal acts. In this respect, the CCE would give rise to a viable
juror divergence claim because the statute requires commission of at
least two 178 drug-related felonies to constitute the "continuing series"
element of a CCE offense. 179 Thus, under the distinct-crimes stan
dard, the jury in a CCE case should not be permitted to arrive at a
general verdict of guilt or innocence when they disagree as to which of
the defendant's acts constituted a "continuing series" under the
statute.
Some courts, however, frequently employ the distinct-crimes
standard to reject factual divergence claims. ISO These courts reason
judicial approaches to materiality, criticized them, and provided a resolution based on
"careful analysis of the evidentiary context in each case." Id. at 42,46. This more sensible
approach to determining which facts require jury agreement is to proceed on a case-by-case
basis, focusing on the avoidance of juror confusion. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has recently
identified a number of situations that might necessitate specific juror unanimity. Jeffries v.
Blodgett, 974 F.2d 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing a Washington aggravated first
degree murder statute and concluding that the jury was not required to specify mitigating
factors and the corresponding weight that it assigned to them). In Jeffries, the court stated
that general juror unanimity was not sufficient when the nature of the evidence presented
was complex, when there was a discrepancy between the evidence and the indictment, or
when some other factor was present to create a genuine possibility of juror confusion. Id.
177. See. e.g., Cook v. State, 741 S.W.2d 928, 934-36 (Tex. 1987) (holding that the
jury did not have to agree on the type of felony that supported a felony-murder conviction),
vacated on other grounds, 488 U.S. 807 (1988); State v. Franco, 639 P.2d 1320, 1323-24
(Wash. 1982) (recognizing that convicting jurors were not required to agree on alternative
methods of violation specified in a statute that addressed driving while under the influence
of drugs or alcohol); People v. Sullivan, 65 N.E. 989, 996 (N.Y. 1903) (concluding that
convicting jurors were not required to agree on a theory of premeditation or of felony
murder in finding the defendant guilty of first-degree murder). See generally Mark A.
Gelowitz, Note, Jury Unanimity on Questions of Material Fact: When Six and Six Do Not
Equal Twelve, 12 QUEENS L. J. 66 (1987). See also Howe, supra note 157, at 26-35.
In Walsh v. United States, 174 F. 615 (7th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 609
(1910), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a jury verdict will not be
upset based on inconsistency where the potential for juror nonconcurrence "is in respect to
immaterial particulars concerning the means by which the crime was committed." Id. at
620. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112
(3d Cir. 1975), recognized the "separate crimes" standard for materiality. Id. at 117 n.9,
117-18.
178. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the present conflict
among the circuits as to whether a "continuing series" under the CCE statute means two or
three drug-related felonies.
179. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988); see supra note 20.
180. Some courts have held that juries may convict the defendant of a crime without
agreeing whether the defendant was a principal or an accessory to the offense. See, e.g.,
State v. Wixon, 631 P.2d 1033 (Wash. App. 1981); Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d 288 (Wis.
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that the separate acts which are prohibited by a single statute are
merely different ways of committing a single crime. Several courts
have held that when the crime was of a "continuous" nature, and thus
still "single," the jury need not concur as to which of the defendant's
alleged multiple acts constituted the charged offense. 181 These courts
often defer to the legislative history of the statute involved to establish
that the lawmakers intended to create a single offense.l 82 One court
stated that, "[o]nly if the statute describes several separate and distinct
offenses must there be a unanimous verdict as to each separate crime
described." 183 Indeed, if the Seventh Circuit in Canino 184 had ad
dressed the juror factual divergence problem in more depth, it is possi
ble that the court would have taken this position and deferred to the
legislative history of the CCE. The court might have viewed the CCE
as describing a single offense in the abstract, emphasizing the fact that
the predicate acts required by this provision are continuous in nature
and really only amount to a single crime.
As an alternative to the distinct-crimes test, several courts have
taken an approach which focuses on whether the evidence under a
single charge discloses distinct acts which could each give rise to cul
pability.l8s Under this approach, courts focus on the defendant's al
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980). In addition, courts have concluded that jurors
need not agree on the underlying acts that establish a conspiracy to convict the defendant.
See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1202 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 949 (1982).
181. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255 (D.C. App. 1988) (concluding
that convicting jurors do not have to agree on which two acts of intercourse formed the
basis to convict the defendant of rape charges despite the fact that the acts occurred several
minutes apart and were separated by an interruption arising from the approach of strangers
and an alleged act of oral sodomy). ct. Jeffries v. Blodgett, 974 F.2d 1179, 1192 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding that a "crime" or a "scheme" were merely alternative ways of committing
aggregated first-degree murder and thus a specific crime was not an element of aggravating
circumstance under the Washington statute); United States v. Sasser, 971 F.2d 470, 478
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the falsity of earnest money deposits and down payments
were "intimately intertwined" and "not conceptually distinct acts," thus the district court's
refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction was not an abuse of discretion), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1292 (1993); United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the trial court was not required to instruct the jury that they must be in unanimous agree
ment on which of several instances of LSD possession formed the basis for a guilty verdict
on drug-possession charges).
182. State v. Franco, 639 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Wash. 1982).
183. Id.; see also State v. Arndt, 553 P.2d 1328 (Wash. 1976).
184. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1940 (1992).
185. See Scarborough v. United States, 522 A.2d 869, 873 (D.C. App. 1987) (en
banc) (holding that the juror nonconcurrence issue should depend on whether "each act"
alleged under a single count could be conceived separately). The distinct-acts test is a
modification of a distinct-incidents test which focused on whether the evidence reveals dis
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leged acts rather than on the specific crime or crimes charged and
recognize the possibility of requiring specific juror agreement as to
such acts. 186
This standard would seem to apply effectively to the CCE juror
agreement problem. The predicate acts that comprise a "continuing
series" are separate acts, in the sense that each is a drug-related fel
ony.187 Although each predicate act could not separately give rise to a
continuing criminal enterprise, a combination cjf any two or three l88 of
those acts may provide the basis for CCE culpability. Under the dis
tinct-acts test, therefore, juror agreement in cases involving the CCE
statute should be specific with respect to the predicate acts that com
prise a "continuing series of violations."
One commentator has suggested that this case-by-case analysis
should be composed of two steps.189 First, the court should consider
whether the evidence under a single charge establishes divisible bases
for determining the defendant's guilt and, second, the court must de
cide when juror divergence on these different bases would undermine
the decision that the defendant had committed the charged offense. l90
In a CCE case, the government must present evidence to support
its allegation that the defendant committed at least two drug-related
felonies. 191 These acts must be separate and distinct in order to satisfy
the "continuing series" requirement of the statute. 192 Allowing jurors
to convict a defendant charged with a CCE offense without specifying
upon which acts they relied to find a "continuing series" under the
statute would permit conviction even when half of the jurors believed
the defendant committed two particular drug-related felonies, while
the remaining six jurors relied on two completely different felonies.
tinct "incidents" that establish the defendant's guilt on a single count. See Howe, supra
note 157, at 38; see also Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1335 (D.C. App.
1985) (recognizing that factual juror nonconcurrence is a viable claim when "one charge in
the indictment encompasses two separate incidents"), cm. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988).
For commentary supporting the distinct-acts test as the superior measure, see Howe, supra
note 157, at 38. Professor Howe commented that the distinct-acts test was "more appropri
ate than the distinct-incidents test because it can identify more true factual nonconcurrence
problems." [d.
186. Scarborough, 522 A.2d at 873; Derrington, 488 A.2d at 1335.
187. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(I) (1988); see supra note 20.
188. See supra note 31 for a discussion of the conflict among the circuits as to
whether the CCE "continuing series" requires two or three predicate narcotics violations.
189. Howe, supra note 157, at 35-36.
190. [d. at 36.
191. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(I); see supra note 20.
192. § 848(c)(2); see supra note 20.
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Such a result, which the Seventh Circuit's decision in Canino 193 would
seem to permit, raises a substantial doubt as to what acts, if any, the
defendant committed. Under due process, this doubt would bar a con
viction for any of the acts individually on constitutional grounds. 194
In some instances, juror agreement on the predicate acts that es
tablish a continuing series would not present a problem. For instance,
if only two drug-related felonies were alleged,195 a convicting jury
could have relied only on those two alleged acts. In other cases, how
ever, such as Canino 196 and Echeverri,197 where the government al
leged a number of drug violations,198 the issue of juror factual
concurrence becomes problematic. Some factual concurrence on the
predicate acts that constitute a continuing series under the CCE must
be required in order to protect the defendant's due process rights. 199
This conclusion arises from the fact that the continuing series provi
sion is an element of the offense2°O and the acts which comprise the
continuing series are separate felonies. Substantial juror divergence on
those underlying felonies raises doubt as to whether the defendant ac
tually committed the necessary number of predicate offenses required
by the CCE.
2.

Number of Jurors that Must Agree

If due process requires some juror agreement as to which of the

CCE predicate acts the defendant committed, the next question is,
how many jurors must agree that the defendant committed a particu
lar series of acts in order to satisfy the due process standard? The
answer to this question depends upon how much juror divergence
raises a "reasonable doubt" concerning the defendant's guilt or inno
193. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1940 (1992).
194. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (recognizing that due process in a
criminal case requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt prior to conviction); see
supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text.
195. Two felonies would support a CCE conviction in a jurisdiction that interprets a
CCE continuing series to be two or more drug-related felonies as opposed to three or more.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dispute among the circuits
as to whether a "continuing series" means two or three drug-related felonies.
196. 949 F.2d at 928.
197. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988).
198. See Canino, 949 F.2d at 933 (the indictment specified five different drug-related
transactions); Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 639 (the defendant was charged with five drug-related
acts).
199. See supra note 162 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's due process standard.
200. See supra note 77.
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cence on a particular charge. The Supreme Court has indicated that
in non-capital cases with a twelve-person jury, due process requires
less than complete unanimity,201 but something more than a simple
majority.202
In Johnson v. Louisiana, 203 the Court indicated that a "substan
tial majority" of the jurors must be in agreement on the defendant's
guilt in order to convict. 204 In Johnson, the defendant was convicted
by a nine to three verdict and the Court decided that the lack of abso
lute jury unanimity did not violate due process of law.205 In a concur
ring opinion, Justice Blackmun suggested that he would have difficulty
convicting a defendant where less than three-quarters of the jurors
agreed.206
In a CCE case, due process requires that a substantial majority of
the jurors specifically agree on which predicate acts the defendant
committed to constitute a continuing series under the statute. Because
of the potential for harsh minimum sentencing penalties under the
201. The Supreme Court has left open the possibility that juror unanimity on the
facts that underlie the defendant's conviction might be required in capital cases. Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 356 (1972) (noting that the state required a unanimous jury ver
dict in capital cases); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (recognizing that in no
state can a defendant be sentenced to death by less than 12 jurors); Burch v. Louisiana, 441
U.S. 130, 131 n.l, 138-39 (1979) (requiring unanimity of a six-person jury to convict the
defendant ofa non-petty offense); accord Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 n.1 (1972)
(recognizing an Oregon statute that required jury unanimity in cases of first-degree mur
der). Support for this heightened level ofjuror agreement rests on the fact that a conviction
in such cases results in the defendant's death. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38
(1980) (stating that the death penalty is significantly different from other punishments and
consequently, heightened reliability of the jury's verdict of guilt in capital cases is required);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (recognizing "qualitative dif
ference between death and other penalties" which necessitates increased reliability when
the defendant is sentenced to death).
202. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 356 (upholding the constitutionality of a state law allowing
less than unanimous guilty verdicts in non-capital cases when at least 9 of 12 jurors agreed);
Burch, 441 U.S. at 130 (holding that where a six person jury is empaneled in a nsm-capital
trial, a conviction required juror unanimity of the defendant's guilt); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at
404 (upholding the constitutionality of a state law allowing less than unanimous guilty
verdicts in non-capital cases when at least 10 jurors agreed).
203. 406 U.S. at 356.
204. Id. at 362.
205. Id. at 363.
206. Id. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was not as clear, how
ever, on where he would draw the line of juror agreement:
I do not hesitate to say, either, that a system employing a 7-5 standard, rather
than a 9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford me great difficulty. As Mr. Justice
White points out, ... 'a substantial majority of the jury' are to be convinced.
That is all that is before us in each of these cases.
Id.
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CCE,207 including the possibility of a death penalty,20B a substantial
majority in such cases should be at least three-quarters of the jury. 209
Anything less would create a reasonable doubt that would render a
guilty verdict unconstitutional under the Court's standard of due
process.
B.

The Supreme Court's Attempt to Deal With the Problem of
Juror Divergence on Factual Issues

The Supreme Court recently confronted the constitutional aspects
of a factual juror nonconcurrence claim in Schad v. Arizona. 210 The
Court's decision in Schad was its first attempt in this century to ad
dress this problem. 2l1 The case involved an Arizona statute which
defined three ways of committing the offense of first degree murder,
and the Court concluded that the jury was not required to agree upon
which theory they found the defendant guilty.212
In Schad, the defendant, Edward Schad, had been convicted of
violating an Arizona statute213 which specified that the crime of first
degree murder encompassed any murder that fell within one of three
general categories. 214 The statute defined the crime of first degree
207. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988) (requiring a minimum sentence of 20 years); id.
§ 848(b) (providing certain conditions for life imprisonment); see supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
208. 21 U.S.c. § 848(e) (providing certain conditions for death penalty). There is an
argument to be made that CCE cases should also leave open the possibility of absolute juror
unanimity on the underlying predicate acts that constitute a continuing series under the
statute. See supra note 201 and accompanying text for a discussion of unanimity in capital
cases.
209. See supra note 206 and accompanying text for a supporting view of Justice
Blackmun, with reference to general gUilty verdicts.
210. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
211. Two Supreme Court cases presented similar juror nonconcurrence claims in the
late 19th century. See Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481 (1898); St. Clair v. United
States, 154 U.S. 134 (1894). In St. Clair, the Court did not directly address the defendant's
claim that the indictment was duplicitous and simply declared that the indictment was
proper. St. Clair, 154 U.S. at 146. Similarly, the Andersen Court did not definitively ad
dress the factual nonconcurrence aspect of the defendant's duplicity claim, but the Court
did reject his claim that the indictment was invalid. Andersen, 170 U.S. at 503-04. C/.
Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 636 (1896) (recognizing that the alternative ways of
committing fraud, which were listed in the statute, could be alleged in one count), overruled
by Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914).
212. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2503-04.
213. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (West Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978).
214. [d. The statute provided as follows:
A murder which is perpetrated by means of poison or lying in wait, torture or by
any other kind of wilful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or which is committed
in avoiding or preventing lawful arrest or effecting an escape from legal custody,
or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape in the first degree,
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murder as murder that was either (1) wilful or premeditated, (2) com
mitted in an attempt to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or in substanti
ating an escape, or (3) committed during specified felonies. 21s The
prosecution submitted that Schad was guilty of premeditated and fel
ony murder216 and the trial court charged the jury on both theories
without any requirement that they agree upon which type of murder
Schad had committed. 217 The jury returned a guilty verdict and
Schad was sentenced to death. 218
Although Schad had not requested separate verdicts, he claimed
on appeal that the trial judge erred in failing to require the jury to
issue separate verdicts on the two alleged theories of first degree mur
der.219 The Supreme Court rejected his claim and concluded that pre
meditated murder and felony murder were merely two methods of
committing a single crime. 220 Therefore, the Court held that the con
victing jurors were not required to agree on the particular theory of
first degree murder. 221
A divided United States Supreme Court noted that the potential
for juror disagreement on the different bases of culpability under the
statute should be evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and not the Sixth Amendment.2 22 All of the Justices
indicated that factual disagreement among jurors would violate the
Constitution in some instances,223 but none of them provided clear
answers regarding when and why such situations would arise to re
quire that trial courts demand specific juror agreement on certain fac
tual elements.
robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem or sexual molestation of a child under
the age of thirteen years, is murder of the first degree. All other kinds of murder
are of the second degree.
Id.; see Schad, III S. Ct. at 2495 n.1.
215. § 13-452.
216. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2495.
217. Id. The judge instructed the jury: "[a]1l12 of you must agree on a verdict. All
12 of you must agree whether the verdict is guilty or not guilty." Id.
218. Id. at 2495.
219. Id. at 2495-96.
220. Id. at 2496.
. 221. [d. Thus, the Court seemed to take the single crime approach to the Arizona
statute. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text for a dlscussion of the single crime
approach to the requirement of juror agreement.
222. [d. at 2498 n.5. In Schad, Justice Souter wrote for a plurality of four. [d. at
2493. Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion. [d. at 2505 (Scalia, J., concur
ring). Finally, Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion for the remaining four justices.
[d. at 2507 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
223. See infra note 226 for Justice Scalia's comment regarding when juror divergence
on factual issues would not be permissible.
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Five Justices concluded that the Constitution does not require ju
rors to agree on which theory, premeditated or felony murder, the de
fendant was guilty as long as the State had declared that these theories
were merely two ways of committing a single crime. 224 The Court
indicated that the requirement of factual juror agreement would only
apply to the "elements" of a crime. 225 One of these five Justices, Jus
tice Scalia, did not join the plurality opinion because he disagreed with
the deference it gave to a state's definition of what constitutes a single
crime. 226 The dissenting opinion, written by Justice White, concluded
that juror agreement on the alternative theories of first degree murder
was always required for a conviction to be constitutional. 227
The plurality, in an opinion written by Justice Souter, concluded
that a general unanimity instruction was sufficient for two reasons.
First, the Court found that the distinct requisite mental states required
under the state statute228 reflected equal notions of blameworthiness
and that Arizona had indicated, through repeated supreme court deci
sions,229 that premeditated murder and felony murder were not sepa
rate crimes, but two ways of committing a single crime. 230 Second, the
statute's approach of equating two mental states, either of which
would satisfy the crime of first degree murder, was historically recog
nized.231 Justice Souter went no further in articulating the basis for a
conclusion that the Arizona practice was constitutional. He indicated,
however, that where a single offense could be committed by alternate
modes that appeared to involve different degrees of culpability, the
224. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2496. Justice Souter, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy came to this conclusion.
225. Id. at 2499-500. See supra note 77 for a discussion of "continuing series" provi
sion of the CCE as an element of that offense.
226. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Scalia pointed out, "We
would not permit, for example, an indictment charging that the defendant assaulted either
X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday." [d. at 2507.
227. [d. at 2507 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
JJ.).
228. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (West Supp. 1973) (repealed 1978); see supra
note 214.
229. See State v. Schad, 788 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Ariz. 1989); State v. Encinas, 647 P.2d
624 (Ariz. 1982).
230. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2498; see also Schad, 788 P.2d at 1168 (indicating that
premeditated murder and felony murder were two ways of committing a single crime);
Encinas, 647 P.2d at 627 (declining to require an instruction that jurors in a first-degree
murder case must agree as between premeditated and felony-murder theories).
231. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2502. Justice Souter concluded that "[a]merican jurisdic
tions have modified the common law by legislation classifying murder by degrees, the re
sulting statutes have in most cases retained premeditated murder and some form of felony
murder ... as alternative means of satisfying the mental state that first-degree murder
presupposes." Id.
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Constitution might necessitate treatment of those modes of conduct as
separate crimes. 232 In addition, Justice Souter noted that other factors
might be relevant to the question, but he did not explain what those
factors were. 233
For the dissent, Justice White concluded that the due process
principles of Winship 234 required that the prosecution prove and the
jury agree on the facts necessary to constitute the crime at issue "be
yond a reasonable doubt. "235 The dissent reasoned that the possibility
of juror divergence on the mens rea elements of first degree murder
under the Arizona statute created a reasonable doubt which would
make the conviction unconstitutional under due process standards. 236
Justice White seemed to adopt a "separate-crime" criteria for deter
mining when materially different bases of cUlpability are present. 237
The state statute at issue in Schad involved a single act, first de
gree murder, that could have been achieved by one of three criminal
means. It can be distinguished from cases involving multiple of
fenses. 238 The Fifth Circuit has recognized, in a case involving various
perjury violations, that the circumstances in Schad differ "from the
situation where a single count as submitted to the jury embraces two
or more separate offenses, though each be a violation of the same stat
ute. "239 Commission of a CCE involves at least two or three violative
acts,24O each of which is a drug-related crime. 241 The Schad Court did
Id. at 2503.
Id. at 2504. Justice Souter stated,
We would not warrant that these considerations exhaust the universe of
those potentially relevant to judgments about the legitimacy of defining certain
facts as mere means to the commission of one offense. But they do suffice to
persuade us that the jury's options in this case did not faIl beyond the constitu
tional bounds of fundamental fairness and rationality.
232.
233.

Id.
234. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
235. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at
364).
236. Id. at 2509.
237. Id. at 2510. Justice White presented a hypothetical that demonstrated an im
material fact that would not require juror agreement. He stated that a factual issue in the
case of a burglary where there was a dispute as to whether the defendant pried a window
open with a screwdriver or a crowbar would be immaterial. Id. See supra notes 177-83
and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinct-crimes theory as it relates to the
juror nonconcurrence problem.
238. The Schad plurality expressly limited its decision to the facts of the case before
it. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2504. Indeed, Justice Scalia, emphasized this point in his Schad
concurrence. Id. at 2507 (Scalia, J., concurring); see supra note 226.
239. United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 927 (5th Cir. 1991).
240. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988); see supra note 20.
241. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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not clearly define what circumstances would necessitate specific juror
agreement, but indicated that such agreement would be required with
respect to "independent elements" of a crime. 242
The Schad Court determined that the alternative ways of com
mitting first degree murder under the Arizona statute were not ele
ments of that offense, however, in a CCE case, the "continuing series"
provision constitutes an independent element of the CCE.243
C.

Due Process Requirements of Juror Unanimity on the
Continuing Series Element of the CCE

Due process guarantees the defendant the right to a conviction
based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 244 When the jurors in a
CCE case cannot agree upon which acts the defendant has committed,
not only does the verdict lack proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to
each of the predicate offenses individually, but there is also a reason
able doubt as to the CCE violation as a whole. If six jurors are con
vinced that the defendant committed predicate crimes "A," "B," and
"C," and six are convinced that the defendant committed predicate
crimes "D," "E," and "F," there is not a clear consensus that the
defendant committed any of the predicate crimes because only half of
the jurors agree that the defendant committed any individual of
fense. 245 Based on the Winship standard of due process,246 this type of
juror divergence on the CCE predicate acts raises a reasonable doubt
as to whether the defendant actually engaged in a continuing crimi
nal enterprise. A conviction under such circumstances, which the
Canino 247 decision would seem to permit, would be contrary to the
Court's established standard of due process. 248
In a CCE case, the jury should be instructed that they must agree,
by a substantial majority, on which of the defendant's alleged acts they
relied to find a "continuing series" under the statute. Furthermore,
242. Schad, III S. Ct. at 2499.
243. See supra note 77.
244. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970); see supra notes 162-73 and accompa
nying text.
245. The Schad facts present a different situation. In Schad, if six jurors were con
vinced that Schad had committed premeditated murder and six .were convinced that he had
committed felony murder, all of the jurors would still be in unanimous agreement that the
defendant had committed the act of murder. The Court's opinion would seem to indicate
that such a scenario would not be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt for purposes of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Schad: III S. Ct. at 2503-04.
246. Winship, 397 U.S. at 359-64.
247. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1940 (1992).
248. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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the harsh sentencing proVisions of the CCE,249 including certain con
ditions for the death penalty,250 prompt the conclusion that no less
than three-quarters of the jury must agree on the defendant's predicate
acts. 2S1
While the Schad Court did not require specific juror agreement
on the mens rea provisions of an Arizona first degree murder stat
ute,252 the Court did indicate that such agreement would be required
on the elements of a crime. 253 The "continuing series" provision of the
CCE was intended as an element of the overall CCE offense. 254 More
over, while the defendant in Schad was convicted of only one criminal
act that he could have committed in a number of ways, in CCE cases,
the government presents a number of separate acts to the jury. Even if
the jury in Schad disagreed as to the manner in which the crime of
first degree murder occurred, there would still be proof beyond a rea
sonable doubt that a murder was committed. Conversely, in a case
involving the CCE, if the jury disagreed as to the predicate acts the
defendant had committed, there would be a reasonable doubt as to
whether a "continuing series" of violations existed at all. The mens
rea alternate ways of committing first degree murder under the Ari
zona statute must be distinguished from the predicate crimes required
for a conviction of a CCE offense, as the latter represent distinct crimi
nal acts which form the basis for CCE conviction.
The Supreme Court's attempt to address juror divergence on fac
tual issues did not go far enough to delineate when specific agreement
among jurors should be required. Cases involving the CCE represent
a situation where a substantial majority of the jurors should be re
quired to agree on the predicate act violations which constitute a "con
tinuing series" under· the statute. In order to address the practical
problem of assuring that the necessary agreement exists in a particular
case, it may be helpful to compare the use of special verdicts in the
courts to assure juror agreement in cases involving a complex statu
249. 21 U.S.c. § 848(a) (1988).
250. Id. § 848(e).
251. See supra note 206 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Black
mun's concurrence in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Blackmun, J., con
curring), concluding that the defendant's due process rights would be violated by allowing
a jury to convict when less than three-quarters of the jurors are convinced.
252. See supra text accompanying note 215.
253. Schad v. Arizona, III S. Ct. 2491, 2499-500 (1991).
254. See supra note 77. The dissent in Schad would most likely categorize the predi
cate acts that constitute a CCE "continuing series" as separate crimes, deserving of specific
juror agreement. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2510 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
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tory crime, similar in structure to the CCE-the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").2ss

D.

Comparison of the CCE with RICO

Like the CCE provision of the Controlled Substances Act,2S6
RICO describes a complex statutory crime. Both statutes respond to
the special dangers and problems involved with organized crime, and
both attempt to counteract the growing influence of organized crime
over the nation's economic and political bodies. 2s7 While the CCE is
specifically targeted at the organizers and supervisors of large drug
rings,2S8 RICO takes aim at all organized crime. 2S9 Under RICO, it is
unlawful for any individual to be part of an "enterprise"260 "through a
pattern of racketeering activity."261 The RICO statute does not ex
pressly define "pattern of racketeering activity," and the meaning of
this element currently represents one of the most controversial issues
of interpretation arising under RICO.262 However, the term "pattern"
255. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988».
256. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988».
257. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement ofFindings and Pur
pose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,922-23 (1970).
258. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1988); see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
259. Various courts have recognized that the purpose of RICO is to eradicate cor
ruption caused by organized crime. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499
(1985) (recognizing that in enacting RICO Congress intended to reach both "legitimate"
and "illegitimate" enterprises); United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 1986)
(concluding that Congress meant to define the wrongful conduct that constitutes the predi
cate acts for a federal racketeering charge in a more generic sense), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1019 (1987); United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that
RICO was intended to eradicate organized crime rather than to subject average criminals
to the chapter's increased punishment), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); United States v.
Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 33 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing that Congress intended RICO to be
interpreted to apply to activities that corrupt public entities), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910
(1982).
260. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). The RICO statute defines "enterprise" as "any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. Such an enterprise
can arise in several forms. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-93 (1981)
(including both legitimate and illegitimate organizations in the definition of a RICO "enter
prise"); United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1399 (S.D. N.Y. 1985) (holding that
the existence of an enterprise may be established if the government proves that a group of
persons with common goals, collective interests, and an ongoing body of personnel exists).
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
262. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. See Michael Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern:" [sic]
The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship," 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971 (1988); Ethan M.
Posner, Note, Clarifying a "Pattern" of Co.~fusion: A Multi-factor Approach to Civil
RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (1988); Stephen G. Harvey,
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is defined in the statute and requires at least two predicate acts of
"racketeering activity" within ten years of one another.263
The "continuing series" element of the CCE can be equated to the
"pattern" provision of RICQ264 in that both require the defendant to
commit a number of illegal acts which constitute the larger offense. 26S
Note, The Pattern Requirement in Civil RICO is Working: Case Law After Sedima, 33
L. REV. 205, 209 (1988) (noting extensive split of authority).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The RICO statute defines "racketeering activity" as
"predicate acts" including any act or threat in violation of any of eight specified state felo
nies or 25 specified federal offenses, including any violation punishable under the federal
mail, wire, and securities fraud statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
The Supreme Court has commented on the "pattern" element, stating that the legisla
tive history of RICO indicates that "two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not consti
tute a pattern." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985). The Court
discussed the concept of continuity as the basis for a RICO pattern and held that the
predicate acts of racketeering activity under RICO must be continuous and related to con
stitute a "pattern" under the statute. Id. Since Sedima, the Supreme Court has recognized
that Congress intended that RICO have "a more stringent [pattern] requirement than proof
simply of two predicates." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237
(1989); see also Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22,30 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Racketeer
ing acts, then, do not constitute a pattern simply because they number two or more."), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988).
264. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
In United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 1988), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged the similarity between the RICO and
CCE charges in its discussion of the CCE. The Echeverri court commented,
Moreover, with respect to the RICO count, a count analogous to the CCE count in
question here, the district court gave a careful unanimity instruction regarding
the predicate acts and issued special verdict forms which required the jury to
designate the specific predicate acts upon which they had unanimously agreed.
Id. (emphasis added). The court went on to state that due to the absence of similar specific
unanimity instructions with respect to the elements constituting a "continuing series"
under the CCE charge, the jury may have erroneously inferred that such specific unanimity
on that charge was unnecessary. Id. Had the trial court used a similar instruction regard
ing the "continuing series" element of the CCE count, unanimity would not have posed the
problem that it did on appeal.
265. The relevant portion of the RICO statute states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
The relevant portion of the CCE statute states as follows: "For purposes of subsection
(a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if ... (2) such
violation is part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of
this chapter." 21 U.S.c. § 848(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
There are, however, differences between the two statutes that might discourage com
parison of them. First, the RICO "pattern" must be undertaken within certain time limita
tions to achieve the statute's goal of punishing continuous racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (stating a time limitation of 10 years). Conversely, the CCE "continuing series"
element does not contain any time limitations. Instead, that CCE element requires that the
VILL.
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The RICO statute, like the CCE, does not expressly address the prob
lem of juror agreement with respect to the requisite predicate offenses.
Consequently, a conflict has arisen among the circuits as to whether a
RICO conviction will survive after some of the defendant's predicate
act convictions, forming the basis for the RICO conviction, are va
cated, but at least two of those convictions remain. 266 At the heart of
this conflict is the juror concurrence problem. If the jury were re
quired to specifically agree upon which of the defendant's acts consti
tuted a RICO pattern, this conflict would not present a problem. Such
specific agreement, made clear through the use of special verdict
forms,267 would specifically provide the grounds upon which the de
fendant was convicted and, therefore, prevent any confusion as to
which acts the jury found to constitute a RICO pattern. The majority
of jurisdictions uphold the RICO conviction after one or more predi
cate act convictions are vacated on appeal,268 while a minority would
vacate the RICO conviction. 269
As a solution to this problem, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in United States v. Coonan 270 suggested a pro
cess of bifurcating jury deliberations into two segments. 271 First, the
defendant act "in concert with five or more" underlings in order to assure that the CCE
violator holds a position of authority within a particular drug ring and is indeed a "king
pin." 21 U.S.c. § 848(c)(2)(A); see supra note 20. Second, the CCE seeks to punish not
only a certain type of activity, but also a certain type of individual. See supra notes 21-22
and accompanying text. RICO, on the other hand, focuses solely on the defendant's activ
ity. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text. Despite these differences, the two
statutes are quite similar in structure. Both CCE and· RICO define complex statutory
crimes. See supra note 26 a.nd accompanying text. In addition, both statutes give rise to
similar juror unanimity problems because they each require that the defendant commit a
number of predicate acts in order to be found guilty of the charged offense. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c); 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2).
266. See United States v. McCulloch, No. 86 Cnm. 3453 (11th Cir. June 8,1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also
Debra L. Weber, Comment, Reversal of a RICO Predicate Offense on Appeal: Should the
RICO Count Be Vacated?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 183, 185 (1990).
A RICO conviction must be vacated when all convictions for predicate racketeering
acts that formed the basis of the RICO conviction are vacated. United States v. Walgren,
885 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989).
267. See infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text.
268. United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
965 (1983). For a thorough discussion of the majority view on this issue, see Weber, supra
note 266, at 193-95.
269. United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909
(1979). For a thorough discussion of the minority view on this issue, see Weber, supra note
266, at 191-93. The Weber Comment also discusses RICO with respect to verdict consis
tency. Id. at 186-9\.
270. 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1486 (1992).
271. Id. at 889-90. The court's solution did not address the unanimity problem, but

1993]

CRIMINAL LAW-UNITED STATES v. CANINO

307

jury would consider the defendant's participation in the alleged predi
cate "pattern of racketeering activity" offenses by responding to spe
cial interrogatories addressing those offenses. 272 Only after responding
to those interrogatories, and finding that the defendant had committed
the requisite predicate acts, would the jury be advised of the fact that a
RICO conviction required two predicate acts.273 Second, the jury
would be instructed on the requirements of a RICO violation in order
to arrive at a general verdict on that count.274 By eliciting specific
answers from the jury regarding the defendant's predicate offenses at
the outset, the court would be certain as to precisely what acts the jury
found the defendant had committed. 275 The court in Coonan com
mented that the second RICO instruction would not take away any of
the jury's fact-finding duties 276 because the charge "does not either
refer to 'patterns' or require the jury to count the number of predicate
acts proven against each defendant. "277
Special verdicts are another option, similar in form to the jury
interrogatories discussed in Coonan, 278 that a court may use to clarify
jury findings in complex cases. 279 Special verdicts contain specific re
did provide a useful mechanism for clarifying the acts on which the jury relied to convict
the defendant.
272. Id. at 889.
273. Id. at 889 n.3.
274. Id. at 889-90.
275. Id. at 891.
276. The Coonan dissent was concerned that the special findings suggested by the
majority would take away the jury's traditional role of fact-finder and run counter to what
it called a customary preference for general verdicts in criminal cases. Id. at 897 (Altimari,
I., dissenting). The dissenting judge was concerned that the court "should not quickly
dismiss any encroachment into the rarely-challenged domain of the jury." Id. at 896. He
stated that this protection arises primarily from the defendant's right to a "fair trial," al
lowing jurors to evaluate the law in light of the facts "without public scrutiny or legal
intervention." Id. at 896-97. The dissent feared that procuring" 'yes' or 'no' answers to
questions concerning the elements of an offense may propel a jury toward a logical conclu
sion of guilt, whereas a more generalized assessment might have yielded an acquittal." Id.
at 897 (quoting United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 927 (2d Cir.) (Newman, I., con
curring in part and dissenting in part), em. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984».
277. Coonan, 839 F.2d at 889 n.3.
278. Id. at 889. As noted by Iudge Newman in Ruggiero, the term "special verdict"
is often used to mean jury interrogatory. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 926 n.l (Newman, I.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49
states that the courts may use special verdicts to procure detailed responses in place of a
general verdict, while jury interrogatories procure detailed findings in concert with a gen
eral verdict. FED. R. CIY. P. 49; see United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 205 n.l
(2d Cir. 1987).
279. See FED. R. CIY. P. 49(a) (1987). The relevant portion of that rule states,
(a) Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict
in the form of a special written finding upon each 'issue of fact. In that event the
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sponses by the jury to a set of questions that the court has submit
ted. 280 They serve the purpose of eliminating uncertainty in cases
involving multiple theories of recovery to reveal "the whole case for
what it is, both fact and law, for complete and final acceptance of the
correct legal theory by the reviewing Court."281
Although the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure sanction the use of
special verdicts in civil cases,282 courts disfavor their use in the crimi
nal arena. 283 Courts view special verdicts in criminal cases as judicial
interference with the jury's duty284 because eliciting such specific re
sponses creates a threat of judicial overbearance on the jurors, who
should be free "from judicial pressure, both contemporaneo1!s and
subsequent."285
Special verdicts are, however, permitted in some criminal
cases. 286 For instance, in criminal conspiracy cases, courts have rec
ognized the suitability of special verdicts when the conspiracy has
court may submit to the jury written questions ... or may submit written forms
of the several special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings
and evidence. . . . The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruc
tion concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury
to make its findings upon each issue.

Id.
280. Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1985).
281. Chief Judge John R. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator,
44 F.R.D. 338, 345 (1968).
282. See FED. R. CIv. P. 49(a) (allowing special verdicts in federal civil cases at the
discretion of the court).
283. See. e.g., United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1084 (2d Cir.) (ac
knowledging that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had indicated
that special verdicts were not generally favored in criminal cases, but upholding their use
when the information sought was relevant to the sentence being imposed), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 845 (1984); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 926 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (recognizing that in some cases courts disfavor jury
interrogatories in criminal cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Mur
ray, 618 F.2d 892,895 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579, 583-84 (2d
Cir. 1976) (stating that special verdicts are improper in criminal cases except where rele
vant to the sentence being imposed), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); see also 9 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 512 (1971 &
Supp. 1981) (asserting that the criminal jury's function does not stop at fact finding).
284. United States v. Spack, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969).
285. Id.
286. See United States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 1988) (reproduc
ing special verdict form and illustrating how it simplified the function of the reviewing
court), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989); Spack, 416 F.2d at 182 n.41 (1st Cir. 1969)
(citing authorities under which special verdicts were permitted in criminal cases); see also
United States v. Washington. 782 F.2d 807,822-24 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing for an alter
native special verdict form).
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more than one object,287 or when the special verdict questions seek
information that is relevant to the defendant's sentence. 288 In fact, in
Schad v. Arizona,289 the Court recognized the Supreme Court of Ari
zona's use of separate verdict forms in cases where alternative theories
of the defendant's guilt were submitted to the jury.290
In addition, Rule 31(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce
dure sanctions the use of special verdicts in criminal forfeiture
cases.29 1 United States v. Angiulo,292 for example, was a RICO case in
which the jury, as part of its overall verdict, returned a special verdict
form finding a variety of the defendant's assets to be subject to forfei
ture. 293 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the legiti
macy of special verdicts in capital punishment cases. 294
In RICO cases where a juror concurrence issue arises under the
"pattern" element,295 some courts have indicated that the jury must
287. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1083. In Orozco-Prada, the court concluded that the
defendant's sentence was defective because the court could not determine the basis of his
guilt. The indictment charged the defendant with a conspiracy that was punishable under
two different sections of a federal statute, which each established different sentencing peri
ods--one for cocaine-related conspiracies, which authorized a 15-year sentence and the
other for marijuana-related conspiracies, which authorized a five-year sentence. Id. With
out a special verdict, the court could not determine whether the object of the conspiracy
was cocaine, marijuana, or both. Id.
288. United States v. Owens III, 904 F.2d 411, 415 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 605 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310,1317
(7th Cir. 1986); Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1084.
289. 111 S. Ct. 2491,2504 (1991); see supra notes 210-37 and accompanying text.
290. Schad, 111 S. Ct. at 2504; see State v. Smith, 774 P.2d 811, 817 (Ariz. 1989).
291. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) states as follows: "If the indictment
or the information alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a
special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfei
ture, if any." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e); see also United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169,
1209 (lst Cir.) (recognizing use of special verdict forms under the forfeiture aspects of
RICO), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990).
292. Angiu/o, 897 F.2d at 1209-16.
293. [d. at 1209.
294. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181-82 (1988). In Franklin, the Court
stated that it has never permitted unlimited juror discretion. Id. at 181. The Court indi
cated that the jury's discretion may be limited, the jury's consideration of mitigating evi
dence may be directed, and in capital sentencing, states may channel jury discretion in an
attempt to reach a fair implementation of the death penalty. Id.
295. In some RICO cases, unanimity does not present a problem. When the defend
ant is separately convicted of two predicate acts which combine to establish a RICO pat
tern, for example, juror unanimity is not an issue because there is no question as to upon
what acts the jury relied to find a RICO "pattern." See United States v. Weisman, 624
F.2d 1118, 1124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980). In Weisman, the district
court's separate convictions on each of the predicate acts of the RICO charge assured the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that the jury had unanimously found the defend
ant guilty of committing a "pattern" under RICO. Id. at 1124. It is when a number of
predicate acts are alleged and not separately proven that the issue of juror unanimity arises
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specifically agree upon which two racketeering acts a particular de
fendant committed296 and some have indicated the value of special
verdicts. 297 For instance, in United States v. Ruggiero,298 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a RICO con
viction because the reviewing court could not be sure from the jury's
general verdict at trial whether the jury's findings of guilt were based
on two or more legally adequate predicate acts.299 In remanding for a
new trial on the RICO charge, the court recommended that the trial
judge "request the jury to record their specific dispositions on the sep
arate predicate acts· charged, in addition to their verdict of guilt or
innocence on the RICO charge."3oo
because there is uncertainty as to precisely which acts the jury relied on to find a pattern of
racketeering activity. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200 for a discussion of when
a factual concurrence problem arises under the CCE.
296. United States v. Stodola, 953 F.2d 266, 272 n.4 (7thCir.) (upholding the suffi
ciency of the district court's instruction, which charged, "You must be unanimous in your
agreement as to what constitutes the two or more acts."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104
(1992); United States v. Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing the
validity of the district court's special forfeiture verdict, which instructed the jury that they
must "unanimously" agree upon the racketeering acts that a "particular defendant commit
ted in reaching the verdict"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1008 (1991); United States v.
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1136 n.74 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating in dicta that the district court's
jury interrogatories on the RICO count, submitted during jury deliberation, were proper),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2010 (1991); United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 648 (3d Cir.
1988) (upholding the district court's use of special verdict forms, which established specific
juror unanimity).
297. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 648; United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 922-23 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
298. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 913. In United States V. Coonan, the dissent cited Rug
giero as one of the "limited" circumstances that would warrant limitation on the jury's
power to render general verdicts. United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886, 897 (2d Cir.
1988); see a/so United States V. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1987); Rug
giero, 726 F.2d at 922-23, 925-28.
299. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 921. In Ruggiero, the defendant was charged, in count
one, with involvement in eight conspiracies which were the predicate offenses to indicate a
RICO "pattern of racketeering" activity. Id.
300. Id. at 923. In RICO cases where the trial court had utilized special verdicts, the
appellate courts had a clear picture of upon which of the defendant's acts the jury had
relied to convict. See United States V. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 851-52 (2d Cir.) (finding the
evidence sufficient to uphold the trial court's conviction under RICO where the jury, by
special verdict, found the defendant had committed nine predicate offenses prior to the five
year statute of limitations for non-capital cases and six predicate offenses within the limita
tions date, from which the appellate court concluded that the RICO pattern was satisfied),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States V. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23,30 (2d Cir. 1981)
(affirming the trial court's RICO conviction wherein the jury was asked to state, as to each
specific transaction, whether it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 945 (1982).
Where the trial court permitted only a general verdict on the RICO count, however,
the appellate court confronted more of a problem. See United States V. Quicksey, 525 F.2d
337, 340-41 (4th Cir. 1975) (upholding the trial court's conviction as long as the govern
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In Echeverri,301 the defendant was accused of both a CCE and a
RICO oifense. 302 The appellate court noted that the district court
gave a careful unanimity instruction on the RICO count with regard
to the predicate acts required thereunder. 303 Furthermore, the district
court required the jury, on special verdict forms, to specify the predi
cate RICO acts upon which they had unanimously agreed. 304 The ver
dict forms revealed unanimous agreement among the jurors that the
defendant had participated in conspiracy to possess and distribute con
trolled substances and had possessed cocaine with the intent to dis
tribute, acts which constituted a RICO "pattern."30S The district
court utilized the special verdict form to clarify which of the defend
ant's acts the jury found to constitute a "pattern" under RICO.306
Similarly, the use of special verdicts in CCE cases would elimi
nate any uncertainty with regard to precisely which of the defendant's
acts the jury's conviction was premised upon. 307 United States v. Bec
ton 308 was the first CCE case to suggest the use of special verdicts. 309
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that
it is "far preferable to list the felonies comprising the criminal enter
prise in the CCE count of an indictment, thereby eliminating the po
tential problems suggested by [the defendant]."310 Such a procedure
ment agreed to re-sentencing, and stating that, "in the absence of a special verdict, it is not
possible to ascertain whether the jury intended to find the defendants guilty of conspiracy
to violate the Travel Act or the Drug Act, or both Acts"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087
(1976).
301. United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra notes 89-117
and accompanying text.
302. Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 639.
303. Id. at 643.
304. Id. After the jury had reached a guilty verdict on the substantive RICO count,
the court instructed the jury to return to the jury room to specify, on a special verdict form,
which racketeering acts they had unanimously found the defendants to have committed.
Id. at 648. Presumably, ifthe verdict form revealed less than unanimity on those predicate
acts, the RICO conviction would not stand.
305. Id.
306. Id. As one commentator has noted, the use of special verdicts in RICO cases
would solve the conflict of whether a RICO conviction could stand after some, but not all,
of the defendant's predicate act convictions were vacated. Weber, supra note 266, at 203;
see supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text. If a special verdict had been used in such a
situation, the reviewing court could simply look to the jury's responses to determine upon
which acts the jury had relied to convict the defendant under RICO.
307. See also United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing
the possibility of the use of special interrogatories in CCE cases, but not allowing them in a
case where the defendant failed to preserve his right to such interrogatories at trial), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1109 (1991).
308. 751 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985).
309. Id. at 257.
310. Id. The defendant, Becton, alleged on appeal that the indictment was imper
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would assure that only drug "kingpins" were convicted under CCE
and subject to the statute's harsh penalties. 3Il Additionally, special
verdicts in these cases would eliminate the potential for confusion as to
whether a CCE conviction could stand if one or more of the defend
ant's predicate offenses were vacated. 312
The complexity of statutes like RICO and the CCE gives rise to
the issue of whether the jury must agree on the predicate acts that the
defendant committed to constitute the substantive RICO or CCE of
fense. Several RICO cases and one CCE case have encouraged the use
of special verdicts in order to clarify jury findings on those predicate
offenses. 313 If a substantial majority of the jurors in a CCE case must
agree on the underlying predicate offenses the defendant has commit
ted to constitute a "continuing series" under the statute, the use of
special verdicts would provide a clear picture of those predicate acts
upon which the jury had relied to convict the defendant of a CCE
offense. Although there are drawbacks in requiring such specific
agreement,314 inCCE cases a heightened level of juror concurrence on
the underlying statutory predicate acts should be required in order to
avoid the possibility of a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's
culpability.315 Through an augmented jury instruction, or through the
use of special verdicts, the trial court could assure such juror agree
ment. Requiring a certain degree of factual specificity is a small price
to assure the "indispensable element"316 of juror agreement. Given
the array of theories and predicate offenses asserted by the prosecution
in cases involving complex statutory crimes like RICO and CCE, spe
cial verdicts are a more appropriate procedural device than general
verdicts to ensure the defendant's right to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 317
missibly vague and therefore violative of due process, and that the indictment should have
listed the alleged felonies in order to protect him from double jeopardy. Id. at 256.
311. See supra notes 23-25 for a discussion of the penalties for a CCE violation.
312. See supra note 266 and accompanying text for a reference to this problem in
RICO cases.
313. See supra notes 296-308 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 276. Drawbacks include the possible usurpation of the jury's
traditional role of fact-finder, a limit on the jury's power to render a general verdict of guilt,
and influence from outside forces on the jury's decision-making process.
315. See supra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
316. United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the
district court's instructions were inadequate in a case involving false statements made to a
federally insured bank, and the lower court should have augmented its instruction where
one count was submitted to the jury on alternative theories).
317. See supra notes 162-209 and accompanying text.
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The "continuing series" element of the CCE318 was intended to
limit the statute's coverage by targeting only those violators who fill
the role of drug "kingpin." The Canino 319 court's analogy between
the "continuing series" and "five or more underlings" elements of the
statute320 failed to consider the dangers involved in permitting juror
divergence on the predicate acts that comprise a CCE "continuing se
ries." Failing to require substantial juror agreement presents a signifi
cant potential for CCE conviction when a reasonable doubt still exists
because a significant portion of the jury could not agree upon which
predicate acts the defendant actually committed. While the danger of
doubt, resulting from juror disagreement, might also exist with respect
to the "five or more underlings" requirement, such doubt is of no con
sequence if that part of the CCE is not an element. Specific juror
agreement, implemented by a special verdict form for the "continuing
series" element of the CCE, would secure significant juror agreement
and protect the defendant's due process rightS. 321
CONCLUSION

The drug problem in the United States has grown to catastrophic
proportions and is no doubt a contributing factor to many other socie
tal problems that exist today. One of the federal government's most
powerful weapons in its arsenal against serious drug violators is the
CCE. Courts have repeatedly upheld the CCE's harsh penalties as
constitutional.322 The statute was meant to both penalize and rehabili
tate major drug lords in an effort to attack the drug problem from the
top of the drug ring chain of command. 323
When it launched this major effort in the "war on drugs," Con
gress never intended to infringe upon the criminal defendant's due
318. As for the "five or more underlings" provision of the CCE statute, it may be
peripheral to the statutory purpose. See United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88-89 (3d
Cir. 1989); see supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. Support for the Jackson ration
ale lies in the fact that all but one of the circuits that have addressed the issue recognize
that the identities of the five or more underlings need not be specified in the jury's verdict.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text. This tends to indicate a general consensus
throughout the circuits that the "five or more underlings" provision is indeed peripheral to
the CCE's purpose.
319. United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1940 (1992).
320. Id. at 946; see supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 162-209 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 48.
323. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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process rights. It seems, however, that decisions like Canino 324 serve
to slowly erode this right in CCE cases. Allowing the type of juror
divergence that the Seventh Circuit permits, creates a significant po
tential for a level of doubt in the jury's verdict that would prohibit
conviction under our concept of due process. In order to remedy this
problem, the courts should require a substantial majority of the jurors
to specifically agree on the predicate acts that constitute the "continu
ing series." To implement this requirement, courts should encourage
the use of special verdicts in CCE cases where the juror non-con
currence problem arises. 325 Such a requirement would benefit the gov
ernment and criminal defendants alike, without being unduly
burdensome. Special verdicts would eliminate the uncertainty that
general verdicts promote in CCE cases. Such findings would also pre
vent any potential problems regarding whether a CCE conviction
could stand after some of the predicate act convictions were vacated.
Consequently, the government would benefit due to a decreased risk of
unjustified acquittals because a defendant would only be acquitted of
the CCE charge if the vacated convictions represented the acts upon
which the jury had relied to find a continuing series. Special verdicts
on the "continuing series" element of CCE would not usurp any of the
jury's functions because the court would still instruct the jury on the
requirements for CCE conviction, leaving them to independently bal
ance rules of law with fairness on each issue.
As congressional legislation becomes more sophisticated, it is im
perative that the criminal defendant's constitutional rights to due pro
cess of law not fall by the wayside. The CCE statute's primary
purpose is to punish the drug lords, not their subordinates. Allowing
significant juror divergence on the predicate acts constituting the stat
ute's "continuing series" element would disrupt that very purpose and
intrude on the CCE defendant's constitutional right to due process of
law.
Katherine L. Harvey

324. United States v. Canino. 949 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1991). cert. denied. 112 S. Ct.
1940 (1992).
325. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.

